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Abstract. Malicious insider threats are difficult to detect and to miti-
gate. Many approaches for explaining behaviour exist, but there is little
work to relate them to formal approaches to insider threat detection.
In this work we present a general formal framework to perform analysis
for malicious insider threats, based on probabilistic modelling, verifica-
tion, and synthesis techniques. The framework first identifies insiders’
intention to perform an inside attack, using Bayesian networks, and in
a second phase computes the probability of success for an inside attack
by this actor, using probabilistic model checking.
1 Introduction
Cyber security considers attacks on organisations from cyber space [5]. While
many organisations are well protected against technical attacks, combinations
of technical attacks with human factors can be devastating. This integration of
human factors and security is important, and extends security to organisational
issues and society. This combination has almost replaced the classical “secu-
rity sciences”, since it is now apparent that in almost all aspects of security
the human factor is crucial. However, it is an open challenge how to integrate
human behaviour into the design and verification of (secure) systems. A com-
mon problem for security analysts is to detect attacks by insiders. Here, more
than anywhere, human behaviour needs to be taken into account when designing
security systems and monitoring information systems.
In this paper, we present a framework that leverages probabilistic modelling
and verification techniques for the analysis of insider threats. As we have shown
in previous work [2], insider threat analysis requires the combination of a macro-
level view and a micro-level view akin to sociological techniques. This is needed
in order to integrate human factors into the context of an infrastructure, like
the physical environment of a company and its IT network. We use Bayesian
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2networks to probabilistically model the human disposition for the micro-level
analysis to estimate when an actor becomes an insider. Additionally, on the
macro-level we use Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) to model actions of an
insider within an organisation’s infrastructure (physical and logical). This two-
fold framework provides a tool for the security analyst to quantitatively estimate
the actual risk of insider threats by an employee of a company at a given moment.
The micro and macro level are represented in our framework as an intentional
analysis and a behavioural analysis. The intentional analysis (see Section 5)
analyses the degree of the intention, in terms of probability, for an employee to
be an insider attacker. Once an employee intends to be an insider attacker, the
behavioural analysis (see Section 6) identifies the probability of success, using
Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) to support our analysis. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first quantitative framework to provide a comprehensive
analysis of malicious insider threats.
Before presenting this framework, we discuss related work followed by an
introduction of the basic concepts of insider threats and probabilistic modelling
techniques in Section 3.
2 Related work
We base our work on existing taxonomies of insiders [10,3]. In previous work [2],
we used Higher Order Logic (HOL) to model insider threats accommodating the
view of the insider’s disposition based on these taxonomies, and insider patterns
based on real case studies [3]. This logical modelling of insider patterns revealed
that HOL allows modelling the human factor with its psychological disposi-
tion, the company’s infrastructure including policies, and use theorem proving
to prove that certain behaviours lead to policy violations, i.e., insider attacks.
However, the need of a company’s security services to quantitatively estimate the
risk of an insider attack needs a more detailed analysis like the probabilistic one
we present here. The Insider threat patterns provided by CERT [3] use System
Dynamics models, which can expres dependencies but do not support probabil-
ities quantifying these dependencies nor any of the probabilistic analysis that
we propose here. Axelrad et al. [1] have used Bayesian networks for modelling
insider threats, and we are currently investigating how their work relates to our
first phase. In earlier work [9], we have used EXASyM [11] to model and analyse
attacks based on the infrastructure of a company expressed as a graph in the
acKlaim calculus and using the PRISM model checker. There, attacks are based
on the probabilities of actors’ movements in the infrastructure corresponding to
a random walk. Here, we embed this previous analysis tool to provide the tool-
ing for the second part of our framework, but significantly extended to Markov
Decision Processes (as opposed to merely Markov Chains) as used in [9].
33 Preliminaries
The behavioural and psychological aspects of actors are related to their personal
profile in many ways. These can be seen as the antecedents or key initial fac-
tors to understanding an individual’s propensity to perform an attack. Nurse et
al. [10] have identified eight elements that may be especially useful in mod-
elling and analysing this aspect of insider threats. These are the precipitating
events (catalyst), an individual’s general personality characteristics, historical
behaviour, concrete psychological state in a situation, attitudes towards work,
skill set, opportunity, and lastly, motivation to attack. All of these values are
hard to measure, but if present, can be used to compute probabilities of the
occurrence and success of actions.
We represent these probabilities in Bayesian networks (BNs) [6], which cor-
respond to the micro level view of our framework. To construct these in general,
one has to collect many possible observations that may be relevant to the prob-
lem and determine what subset of those observations is worthwhile to model,
and then organise the observations into variables having mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive states [4].
BNs are a graphical model that encodes a probabilistic relationship among
variables of interests. In general, a BN for a set of variables X = {X1, · · · , Xn}
is a tuple (S, P ) where S is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that encodes the set
of conditional independence assertions on variables in X , and P is a set of local
probability distributions associated with each variable. These two components
together define a joint probability distribution for X . The nodes in S are in one-
to-one correspondence with the variables in X . We usually use Xi to denote both
the variable and its corresponding node, and Pa(X) to denote the set of parents
of the node X in S as well as the variables corresponding to those parents.
In S, the absence of edges between two nodes (variables) encodes conditional
independencies (of the two variables). In particular, given the structure S, the
joint probability distribution for X is given by
p(x1, · · · , xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi | pai)
where pai denotes the parents of node Xi in S, and P are the distributions
corresponding to the term p(·|·).
On the macro level, we use Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) to identify
potentially successful insider threats:
Definition 1 (MDP). A Markov Decision Process M = (S, s0, A,P, AP, L),
where
– S is a set of states with s0 ∈ S being the initial state;
– A is a set of actions;
– P : S ×A× S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function such that for all
states s ∈ S and actions a ∈ A, ∑t∈S P(s, a, t) ∈ {0, 1}.
– AP is a set of atomic propositions;
4– L : S → 2AP is the labelling function.
For any state s ∈ S and action a, if ∑t∈S P(s, a, t) = 1, then we say the action
a is enabled in s.
4 Framework
The overall aim of our analysis is to estimate the probability that an employee
of an organisation (conceived as the insider) launches a successful insider attack.
We emphasise that, in this work, we only address intentional, malicious insider
threats, meaning that the insider consciously acts as an attacker. In contrast,
the analysis of accidental insider threats – where the insider might be social
engineered by a malicious outsider – is not addressed and is left as future work.
Overall, our framework consists of two components:
– The intentional analysis provides a quantitative measure for the risk that a
particular employee may reach the tipping point and turn into a malicious
insider; and
– The behavioural analysis estimates where an insider could successfully launch
an attack in a company’s infrastructure. This is influenced by the personal
characteristics of the attacker, for example, the attacker’s skill to break a
lock or succeed in social engineering the secretary.
Our framework is quantitative in terms of probabilities, which depend on var-
ious factors, typically including a personal profile and a type of insider threats.
A personal profile comprises a number of factors influencing the person’s be-
haviour; the profile does not describe the behaviour, it is a prediction of likely
behaviour, based for example on tests, profiles, and observed behaviour:
– Individuals’ personality characteristics. The personnel department will often
be able to provide an estimation via some “characteristics test” commonly
used in psychology;
– Psychological state;
– Attitude towards work: should be easily evaluated, and formalised as a vari-
able in the interval [0, 1]; or
– Skill set: for instance whether one can break a locker, whether one has good
knowledge of CCTV, etc.
The personal profile will be used for both the intentional analysis and the be-
havioural analysis below. We also note that the personal profile is time-dependent
and should be updated regularly as some attributes might become invalidated,
jeopardising the precision of the analysis.
The CERT Guide [3] identifies three main types of insider threats, fraud, theft
of intellectual property, and sabotage. Evidently, these types influence both steps
of our analysis; for instance, fraud and theft require different skills, and so the
probability of success differs.
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Fig. 1. Example for System Dynamics model for Entitled Independent [3].
5 Intentional Analysis
In this section, we provide the first component of our framework, i.e., the inten-
tional analysis of potential insider threats. The main aim is to have an estimation
on the degree that an employee of an organisation intends to launch an insider
attack. Formally, this is expressed as the probability that an employee decides
to become an insider attacker. At this stage we do not address whether finally
the attack is accomplished or not; this is the main subject of the behavioural
analysis.
The main part of the analysis is based on Bayesian networks. Modelling using
BNs is widely considered as an art, and requires sufficient domain-specific knowl-
edge. However, for insider threats there exist collections of so called patterns [3],
which turn out to facilitate our modelling significantly. In particular, the System
Dynamics modelling method is exploited. In this methodology abstract variables
define a taxonomy of insider threat cases. Graphically, these variables are pre-
sented in square boxes. A solid arrow from a box containing variable a to one
containing variable b indicates that an increase of a implies an increase of b. A
dashed arrow represents the inverse relationship, i.e., an increase of a implies a
decrease of b. An example pattern for “entitled independent” is given in Fig. 1.
The system dynamics, which only gives a high-level, qualitative description,
still yields a useful starting point of the intentional analysis. Essentially, we sub-
stantially extend the system dynamics by introducing a quantitative description,
which is considerably more precise and useful. Note that the causalities, quan-
tification, or qualification are encoded as a Bayesian network. In light of this, a
crucial step of our methodology is to translate the system dynamics to BN.
The BN has the same graph structure as the system dynamics model, which
we assume to be acyclic.3 In general, for each node in the system dynamics, we
introduce a random variable. We usually have the following cases:
3 We note that in practice, occasionally the cycles exist, which we abstract to their
strongly connected component as a single node, thus obtaining a proper DAG. We
might be able to use Markov logic network to directly encode a system dynamic with
cycles, but this is left as the future work for simplicity.
61. For events that might happen or not, the corresponding random variable is
governed by the Bernoulli distribution, i.e., a random variable which takes
value 1 with success probability p and value 0 with failure probability q =
1− p; A typical case of this kind is the precipitating event in Fig. 1;
2. For quantities over a finite domain, for instance, the psychological state
which might take values from happy, depressed, disgruntled, angry, stressed,
as well as the type of motivation which might take values from financial,
political revenge, fun, competitive-advantage, power, peer-recognition, we usu-
ally introduce discrete random variables with corresponding outcomes as the
domain of the quantity under consideration;
3. For quantities of continuous nature, for instance, dissatisfaction in Fig. 1, in
principle, we can introduce a continuous random variable, say the degree of
dissatisfaction, as a value in [0, 1]. In practice, we usually apply discretisation
to [0, 1] to have a partition of [0, 1].
As the next step, we must specify the conditional probabilities among the
introduced random variables. It is worth noting that the concrete probabilities
are difficult to obtain; however, this is not the main concern of the current paper
which solely aims to establish the basic framework.
We emphasise that such a model should be parameterised, for example with
the type of threat. The reason is that for different threat types, the introduced
random variables should vary, and probably more importantly, the conditional
probabilities differ.
Once the BN is established, the next step is to analyse it. In general, we
abstract the degree of intention as a value Int ∈ [0, 1], and the analysis computes
the probability that the degree of intention falling into interval I exceeds θ, i.e.,
Pr[Int ∈ I] ≥ θ. This is a typical task of prediction. Another kind of analysis is
explanation, for instance, the analyst might be interested in knowing, once the
degree of intention Int ≥ θ, what is the most likely cause?
5.1 Example
To illustrate the intentional analysis framework, let’s consider the case study of
Entitled Independent depicted in Fig. 1.
The events “organisation denial of insider request” and “precipitating event”
are of type (1), and thus are governed by the Bernoulli distribution. For instance
we have that Pr(precipitating event = 1) = 0.1 meaning that with probability
0.1, the employer receives a job offer from a different company. The “insider’s
dissatisfaction” is of type (3), and thus we consider the degree of dissatisfaction
β ∈ [0, 1] and introduce a probabilistic density function (pdf) fβ to specify the
distribution of β. However for computation efficiency, we usually prefer to stay
in the discrete model, so we could partition [0, 1] into [0, 0, 1), [0.1, 0.2), · · · and
specify the probabilities p1, · · · , p10. The intuition is that, say, “the probability
that the dissatisfaction degree being from 0.5 to 0.6 is p5”.
Alternatively, we can define “low”, “mediate”, “high” for the dissatisfaction
degree, which could correspond to [0, 0, 3), [0.3, 0.7), [0, 7, 1] respectively. This
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Fig. 2. Workflow of the behavioural analysis framework [9]
is also the case for “Insider’s desire to steal”, and “Insider’s planning to go to
competitor”, which practically takes value from“yes”, “no”, “not sure”.
As the next step, we need to specify the conditional probability. For the most
interesting case regarding an insider’s desire to steal, this could simplistically be
formulated as a table, where X denotes “Insider’s dissatisfaction”, and Y denotes
“Insider’s planning to go to competitor”.
X Y steal (H) steal (M) steal (L)
High Yes 0.6 0.3 0.1
High Not sure 0.2 0.3 0.5
High No 0.0 0.1 0.9
...
...
...
...
...
6 Behavioural analysis
In this section, we provide the second component of our framework, i.e., the be-
havioural analysis of insider threats. Given the infrastructure of the organisation
and a personal profile, this analysis estimates the probability of successful insider
attacks. Here the infrastructure of the organisation may refer to the physical lo-
cations relevant to the insider threats, their access control policies, etc.
Fig. 2 illustrates the workflow, which consists of the following four main steps:
– Step 1: Model the infrastructure in the abstract system specification;
– Step 2: Map the abstract system specification to the acKlaim process calculus
and generate the transition system;
– Step 3: Translate the transition system into Markov decision processes by
annotating the transitions with probabilities; and
– Step 4: Perform behavioural analysis by verification of the Markov decision
process.
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We now elaborate these steps in details.
Step 1. The abstract system model is specified as a collection of mathematical
constructs that is used to create an abstraction of a real-world system. This
abstraction makes it possible to model physical localities, interconnected com-
puters, actors that can move around in the physical localities, and data that can
be carried by actors or left at both computers or localities. On top of this there
is a fine-grained access control mechanism that limits the mobility of actors, and
protects sensitive data. Figure 3 shows an example of a physical model and its
representation in acKlaim [11].
It should be noted that in the abstract system, there is no means for modelling
dynamic behaviours of actors, but only means of specifying what the initial
structure of the system looks like – a static representation of the system model.
The dynamic behaviour of the model is supported when the model is mapped to
acKlaim in which the semantics of acKlaim uses the abstract system to evaluate
the effects of actors movement.
We note further that the location might be physical or logical. Physical lo-
cations such as HALL in Fig. 3 are self-explained. In contrast, logical locations
provide a valuable means to model human aspects of insider threat. For instance,
it is useful to capture the “secretary” by-pass. Indeed, it is well recognised that
a typical scenario of insider threats is that the attacker obtains privilege (e.g.,
entering certain restricted areas, obtaining the master key) by having special
personal relationship with secretary-like persons such as personal assistant of
the CEO, the receptionist.
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actors as a graph of locations and actors. In order to explore insider behaviour in
organisational models, we use an abstract view on policy formalisations and anal-
ysis: policies describe prerequisites for actions to be granted to actors given by
pairs of predicates (conditions) and sets of enabled actions. We integrate policies
into the infrastructure, providing an organisational model where policies reside
at locations and actors are adorned with additional predicates to specify their
credentials. In Figure 3, the policies are given in grey boxes. For example, the
policy {U: elog, i, o; pc1: e;} attached to the (virtual) node pc2 describes
that the user U can evaluate processes on pc2 but his actions are being logged,
U can input from and output to pc2, and pc1 can evaluate on pc2.
To support automated analysis, we have developed a system specification lan-
guage [9] to specify acKlaim system models in text files, which are the input for
the analyses. The acKlaim models are translated automatically into a transition
system [9, Section 3.5].
Step 3 Once the transition system is generated, we augment it to obtain a
Markov decision process.
Definition 2 (TS). A transition system is a tuple (S, s0,→) where S is a set of
states with s0 ∈ S being the initial state, and →⊆ S ×S is a transition relation.
We note that each state of the TS denotes a location in Step 1. We identify a
subset of terminal states F ⊆ S. Intuitively, these terminal states denote the
places where the insider attack is actually happening. In the framework, we
consider the following probabilities:
– For each state (being physical or logical), there is an entering probability
specifying the probability for an actor (insider) to access that location by
any means. In practice, this depends on various different factors, including
the access control policy the organisation adopted and the personal profile.
Formally, the entering probability is defined as pe : S \ F → [0, 1] where
F is the set of terminal states. Evidently, pe must satisfy some constraints.
In the simplest case, if the actor is allowed to enter by the access control
policy, the entering probability pe = 1. However, even if access is not granted
by the access privilege, there is still a certain probability to enter (e.g., by
breaking the lock of the door which depends on the skill set of the person
under consideration).
– For each terminal state, there is a successful probability specifying the prob-
ability that an actor manages to accomplish the attack after entering the
terminal location, formally defined by ps : F → [0, 1].
– For each state, we also consider the probability of being caught, i.e., when the
insider attempts to perform the attack. We consider the four combinations
(1) successful attack, undetected; (2) successful attack, detected; (3) failed
attack, undetected; (4) and failed attack, detected. Formally, we define two
functions pc : S → [0, 1] specifying the probability of being detected in each
state. Intuitively, these probabilities depend on, for instance, the presence of
surveillance.
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By assuming that the event of being successful and the event of being caught
are independent (which is a reasonable assumption in practice), one can
derive the probabilities for the aforementioned combinations of events.
As before, the model is parameterised. These parameters are used to model
various factors which would impact the probabilities pe(·), ps(·), and pc(·) intro-
duced above substantially. A typical case is the daytime vs night mode; breaking
in during night time might be easier, so the entering probability must be higher.
However, at night, some server might be shut down, so the success probability
might be lower if one wants to download a confidential file from the internal
server. Moreover, the model should be parameterized with personal profiles to
account for attacker skills.
With these probabilities at hand, given the TS (S, s0,→) obtained from the
previous step, we can define an MDP M = (S′, s′0, A,P, AP, L) as follows:
– The state space of the MDP M, S′ = (S ∪ {succ, fail}) × {X,×}; and the
initial state s′0 = (s0,X).
– A = {es,t | (s, t) ⊆→} ∪ {commit};
– For each state of the form (s, ?) where s is not a terminal state and ? ∈
{X,×}, we introduce an action es,t for each edge (s, t) in the TS. We define
the resulting probability distribution P(s, es,t, ·), written µs,t by:
µs,t(t,X) = pe(t) · (1− pc(t))
µs,t(t,×) = pe(t) · pc(t)
µs,t(fail,X) = (1− pe(t)) · (1− pc(t))
µs,t(fail,×) = (1− pe(t)) · −pc(t)
– For each terminal state s, there is only one action commit enabled at s, and
we define the resulting distribution P(s, commit, ·), written µcommit, by:
µcommit(succ,X) = ps(s) · (1− pc(t))
µcommit(succ,×) = ps(s) · pc(t))
µcommit(fail,X) = 1− ps(s) · (1− pc(t))
µcommit(fail,×) = 1− ps(s) · ·pc(t)
– (succ, ?) and (fail, ?) for ? ∈ {X,×} are absorbing states whose transitions
do not affect the analysis. We hence omit the definition here.
Intuitively, the X means that the insider is not caught, while the × de-
notes that the insider is caught; succ denotes success of the insider, while fail
denotes failure. We remark that the definitions of atomic propositions and la-
belling functions depend on the properties one wants to analyse. We postpone
their definitions to the next step.
Example 1. We give a (simplified) example to illustrate the construction of
MDPs, The transition system is depicted in Fig. 4. From the init state, the
insider could go to the office and from there to the file state, or go to the sect
state (bribes the secretary) and from there to the file state as well. For clarity,
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Fig. 5. The fragment of MDP for state init; i, o, s abbreviate init, office, sect respec-
tively.
we only depict the MDP corresponding to the state (init,X). For this state,
there are two enabled actions einit,office (denoted by e1 in Fig. 5) and einit,sect
(denoted by e2 in Fig. 5).
Step 5. For the last step, we analyse the obtained MDPs by standard prob-
abilistic model checking techniques. The number of interest is the maximum
probability that the insider steals a confidential file without being caught. Note
that the insider has different strategies, for instance, selecting where to go from
a physical location, or trying to social engineer other actors. The insider’s goal is
to maximise the success probability, whereas from the organisation’s perspective,
a worst-case scenario should be considered.
Such a problem boils down to the problem of computing the maximum prob-
ability to reach the state (succ,X). Formally, one can introduce AP={Succ,
NCaught} and a labelling function L(succ,X) = {Succ,NCaught}. The logical
formula
Pmax =?[♦(Succ ∧NCaught)]
and the probabilistic model checker PRISM is able to return the maximum
probability, as well as the corresponding strategy of the insider to achieve this
probability. By such an analysis, the organisation can identify the potential
weakness of the infrastructure, and carry out necessary security improvement.
7 Conclusion
Insider threats are hard to capture in a systematic way. Extending on our earlier
work on representing insiders and behaviour with Higher Order Logic, we have
outlined a framework for identifying malicious insider threats in system models
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using probabilistic model checking. Using System Dynamics, this approach cap-
tures the behaviour of insiders, and models both their intent or risk of turning
malicious as well as the risk of an insider action succeeding.
In future work we plan to investigate the relation to attacker profiles, bud-
gets [7,8], and skill sets, threats posed by collaborating insiders, and especially
the threat posed by accidental insider threats.
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